

THE  
EDINBURGH REVIEW,

OR

*CRITICAL JOURNAL:*

FOR

OCT. 1802.....JAN. 1803.

*TO BE CONTINUED QUARTERLY*

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JUDEX DAMNATUR CUM NOCENS ABSOLVITUR.  
PUBLIUS STRUS.

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VOL. I

*Edinburgh:*

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PRINTED BY D. WILLISON, CRAIG'S CLOSE,  
FOR ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE, EDINBURGH;  
AND T. N. LONGMAN & O. REES,  
*LONDON.*

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1803.

## Edinburgh Review

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Article 1 is thought to be by Francis Jeffrey, and Article II by Sydney Smith.

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# ADVERTISEMENT

IN committing this Work to the judgement of the Public, the Editors have but little to observe.

It will be easily perceived, that it forms no part of their object, to take notice of every production that issues from the Press; and that they wish their Journal to be distinguished, rather for the selection, than for the number, of its articles.

Of the books that are daily presented to the world, a very large proportion is evidently destined to obscurity, by the insignificance of their subjects, or the defects of their execution, and it seems unreasonable to expect that the Public should be interested by any account of performances, which have never attracted any share of its attention. A review of such productions, like the biography of private individuals, could afford gratification only to the partiality of friends, or the malignity of enemies.—The very lowest order of publications are rejected, accordingly, by most of the literary journals of which the Public is already in possession. But the Conductors of the EDINBURGH REVIEW propose to carry this principle of selection a good deal farther; to decline any attempt at exhibiting a complete view of modern literature; and to confine their notice, in a great degree, to works that either have attained, or deserve, a certain portion of celebrity.

As the value of a publication, conducted upon this principle, will not depend very materially upon the earliness of its intelligence, they have been induced to prefer a quarterly, to a monthly period of publication, that they may always have before them a greater variety for selection, and be occasionally guided in their choice by the tendencies of public opinion.

In a Review which is published at so long intervals, it would be improper to continue any article from one number to another; and, for this reason, as well as for the full discussion of important subjects, it may, sometimes, be found necessary to extend these articles to a greater length, than is usual in

works of this nature. Even with these allowances, perhaps the reader may think, that some apology is necessary for the length of a few articles in the present Number.—If he cannot find an excuse for them, in the extraordinary interest of the subjects, his candour will probably lead him to impute this defect to that inexperience, which subjects the beginning of all such undertakings to so many other disadvantages

*October 1802*

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THE  
EDINBURGH REVIEW,

OCTOBER 1802.

Art. 1. *De L'Influence attribuee aux Philosophes, aux Francs-Maçons et aux Illumines, sur la Revolution de France.* Par J. J. Mounier: Tubingen. pp. 245.

M. MOUNIER, “a man of talents and of virtue,” according to the great anti-revolutionary writer of this country, the antagonist of Mirabeau, and the popular president of the first National Assembly, is well entitled to be heard upon the causes of the French revolution. He was not only a witness, but an actor, in those scenes, of the origin of which he is treating; and must therefore have felt in himself, or observed in others, the influence of every principle that really contributed to their production. His testimony, it may also be observed, is now given, after ten years of exile may be presumed to have detached him from the factions of his country, and made him independent of the gratitude or resentment of its rulers.

With all these claims to our attention, M. Mounier cannot, however, expect that his authority should be taken for decisive upon so vast and complicated a question. In an affair of this nature, it is not enough to have had a good opportunity for observation, Where so many interests are concerned, and so many motives put in action, a man cannot always give an account of every thing he sees, or even of every thing he has contributed to do, His associates may have acted upon principles very different from his; and he may have the dupe of his opponents, even while he was most zealous in his resistance. It will be remembered, too, that M. Mounier, after co-operating in a revolution that was to consummate the felicity of his country, was obliged to leave it to the mercy of an unprincipled faction; and it may perhaps be conjectured that he who was disappointed in the issue of these transactions, has also been mistaken as to their cause. M. Mounier, finally, is a man of

letters, and is entitled to feel for philosophers some of the partialities of a brother. In denying that they had any share in the French revolution, he vindicates them from a charge that sounds heavy in the ears of mankind; and judges wisely, that it is safer to plead not guilty to the fact, than to the intention.

M. Mounier, however, is not one of those, whom the horror of the revolution have terrified into an abjuration of the principles of liberty. He classes the bigots of despotism with the apostles of insurrection, and adheres steadily to those notions of regulated freedom which could not satisfy the revolutionary ardour of his countrymen. His book is written, upon the whole, in a style of great candour and moderation; and though it will not probably convert those who have faith in an antisocial conspiracy, must be allowed, upon all hands, to contain much acute reasoning, and many judicious remarks.

The work, as is indicated in the title-page, is divided into three parts, in which the charge of revolutionary agency is separately considered, as it applies to the Philosophers, to the Free-Masons, and to the Illuminati of Germany.. The first of these is by much the largest, and contains nearly the whole of the author's reasonings and opinions upon the real causes of the revolution. We shall endeavour to lay before our readers a concise view of his doctrines upon this subject.

It is the clear and decided opinion of M. Mounier, that the revolution in France was brought about, neither directly, by the combination and conspiracy of its philosophers, nor indirectly, by the influence of their writings. It was brought about, he is persuaded, by the ordinary causes of political anger; by the insubordination of the Parliaments, and the disorders of the finance; and by the new and extraordinary remedies that the Sovereign and his ministers thought fit to apply to these disorders.

The refractory and ambitious spirit of the Parliaments had been a source of vexation to the court of France for more than half a century before the name of democracy was heard of in that kingdom. The members of these tribunals were always among the privileged orders; and the rights of the people formed no part of their subjects of their subjects of contention with the Crown. They were suppressed under Lewis XV, and restored by his successor, before there was a man in France who had imagined the possibility of a popular revolution. The finances, on the other band, had been in disorder for little less than a century. Since the time of Cardinal Fleuri, there had been a regular deficiency in the produce of the taxes, and a debt that was

constantly increasing. From the year 1778 to the year 1784, the exigencies of the war with England had increased this debt by a sum of 1250 millions of livres; and when M. Neckar went out of office, the produce of the taxes was incapable of defraying the interest. The Parliaments, in the mean time, refused to register the edicts for new imposts; and it became evident, that the Government must become bankrupt, if the privileged orders were not subjected to a more effectual contribution. As they constituted all the Parliaments, however, it was in vain to hope for the co-operation of these bodies, and with a view to overrule them, or at least to dispense their authority, the *Notables* were assembled in 1787. In spite of all the pains that had been taken to ensure the success of this experiment, it failed. M. de Calonne was dismissed; and M. de Brienne, who succeeded him, undertook to compel the Parliaments to register the Royal edicts in spite of their resistance. The contest had now become a matter of popular interest and attention; and as the taxes, and the pretensions of the noblesse to immunity, were extremely disagreeable to the body of the people, the demand that was suddenly made by the Parliament of Paris for the convocation of the States-General, was seconded by the voice of the whole nation. The States-General had not been assembled since the year 1614. The *Tiers Etat* was at that time in the completest subjection to the Crown and the Nobility; and as the produce of the Royal domain was at any rate sufficient for the ordinary expences of Government, their temper and disposition was but of little national importance. In the year 1788, every thing was different; and the ministry were sufficiently aware, that if the States were once assembled, there was an end to the ancient administration of Government in the country. They resisted the demands of the people, therefore, as long as they possibly could. The convocation of the States-General, in the mean time, was the demand and the petition of every order of men in France: The clergy, the nobility, the capital, the parliaments, and even a considerable proportion of those who were about the person of the Sovereign, concurred in thinking it indispensable to their salvation. The army followed their example; resistance became impossible; the ministry was dismissed; and orders were given for assembling the ancient representatives of the nation.

A revolution was thus brought about, says M. Mounier, in which philosophy had not the slightest operation, and by which the ancient monarchy and aristocracy must necessarily have received some limitation. It was not yet apparent that they were both to be entirely overthrown. Perhaps there was not an individual in the country, that looked forward to the

establishment of a republic. The events that followed, were not necessary consequences of those that had gone before; but were produced by causes of the same description, and owed their origin, alike, to circumstances that had no connexion with the speculations of philosophers.

The chief cause of the failure of this grand experiment, and of the first disorders that accompanied the revolution, was, according to M. Mounier, the dissension that naturally arose among the different orders that had thus been called to deliberate, and the fluctuating and unsteady policy of the Court in its endeavours to overawe, or to reconcile them. As the principal object of this convocation, on the part of the Government, was to relieve the finances, by diminishing the exemptions of the privileged Orders, it would have rendered the whole scheme vain, to have given such a form to the Assembly as would have secured to these Orders the absolute command of its deliberations. A. Neckar, therefore, and a great part of the King's council, were disposed to listen to the applications that were made from all parts of the kingdom for a *double representation* of the Commons. The Parliaments, and most of the Nobility, were against it. Their opposition, however, was disregarded; the double representation was granted; and another question, of still greater importance, presented itself for the consideration of the Government.

By the ancient constitution of the States-General, the three different orders of Clergy, Nobility, and Commons, assembled in separate chambers, and took each of them, their resolutions apart. The Third Estate was sure to be outvoted, therefore, in every question where the interest of the privileged orders was concerned; and the additional number of their representatives would not have secured them from insignificance, if this plan of deliberation had been adhered to. The same circumstances, therefore, that, by raising their consideration, and increasing their importance in the community, had entitled them to obtain a double representation, seemed obviously to require, that the ancient form of convocation should be abandoned, and that their voice should not be entirely without effect in the great Assembly of the nation. Notwithstanding the incalculable importance of adjusting this matter by force of vigorous and immediate resolution, M. Mounier assures us, that the deputies were allowed to repair to Versailles, and the assembly of the States to be opened, before the King's ministers had come to any determination on the subject. It was known, at the same time, that one part of the deputies had been positively instructed by their constituents to contend for the ancient constitution of the States; while others had been

directed to agree to nothing but the re-union of the Three Orders in one deliberative assembly.

The Chancellor de Barentin, in opening the session, congratulated the Third Estate upon the double representation they had so happily obtained, expressed his wishes for the agreement of the Three Orders to a joint deliberation, and ended by recommending it to them to begin by deliberating apart! M. Neckar held the same irresolute and inconsistent language; and each party conceived that the administration would decide ultimately in its favour.—This state of uncertainty only exasperated their prejudices, and fomented their mutual animosity. The ministry wavered and temporized. M. Neckar at last proposed that they should deliberate together, at least upon the question of their future organization. The expedient was probably futile; but it was not put to the test of experiment. After it had been approved of in council, it was suddenly retracted by the influence of a party immediately about the person of the king, and a peremptory order issued for the separation and independence of the Three Orders of representatives. To prepare for the promulgation of this edict, a guard was appointed to exclude the representatives of the Third Estate from the usual place of their meeting. They believed that the council had determined on their dissolution: They adjourned to a tennis-court in the neighbourhood; and, in the enthusiasm of alarm, took the celebrated oath, never to separate till a legal constitution had been established. M. Mounier acknowledges that this oath was fraught with danger to the prerogatives of royalty; but he denies that it was taken in an assembly of republicans; and justifies it, upon the ground of the emergency and alarm by which it was dictated. The councils of the king wanted that firmness that had been shown by the representatives of the people; the re-union of the orders was decreed; and the king commanded the privileged deputies to deliberate along with those of the Tiers Etat.

In all these transactions (says M. Mounier), the philosophers had no participation; they were the result of contending interests, and the consequences of a political conjuncture, to which no parallel could be found in the history of the world; they were the fruits, in a particular manner, of that improvidence and presumption, that neglected the signs of the times, and disdained to provide for events which it chose to consider as impossible. A revolution, however, was already accomplished; and it might have terminated happily at this point, had it not been for fresh imprudencies of which the Government was guilty.

In spite of the dissensions by which they had been preceded, the first

meetings of the National Assembly gave the greatest indications of returning harmony and order, the friends of monarchy, and the advocates for moderation, constituted the great majority, both in that assembly and in the nation. The aristocratical counsellors, however, by whom the king was surrounded in secret, destroyed this fair prospect of tranquillity; they persuaded him to try the effects of terror; they surrounded the metropolis with armies; they dismissed the popular ministers with insult, and replaced them by the avowed advocates of the prerogative. The populace, full of indignation and apprehension. at the military array with which they were surrounded, rose in a tumultuous manner, and demolished the Bastille; a great part of the troops declared for the popular side of the question; the people flew to arms in every part of the country; and the King was once more obliged to submit. The triumph which the lower orders had now obtained, and the dangers they had escaped, inflamed their presumption and their prejudices: the nobility and the higher clergy became the objects of their jealousy and aversion. Men were found in the Assembly, who were capable of employing those terrible passions as the instruments of their own elevation, and of purchasing a dangerous popularity, by the indiscriminate persecution of the aristocracy. Though these incendiaries did not at first exceed the number of 80, in an assembly of 800, their audacity, their activity, the terror of their associates among the rabble, and the disunion of those by whose cooperation they should have been opposed, gave them a fatal ascendancy in the capital, and enabled them, at length, to subject every part of the government to their will. Then followed the outrages of the 5th and 6th of October; the King's flight to Varennes; and the establishment of the republic in bloodshed and injustice.

Such, according to this author, was the true course and progress of the revolution, and such the causes to which it ought to be ascribed. The speculative writings of philosophers had as little to do with it as the lodges of Free-Masonry. The first steps were taken by men who detested the philosophers as infidels, or despised them as visionaries; the last, by men to whom all philosophy was unknown, and who pretended to use no finer instruments of persuasion than the purse and the dagger.

This account is certainly entitled to the praise of great clearness and simplicity, and cannot be denied to have a foundation in truth; but it appears to us to be deficient in profundity and extent, and to leave the revolution, in a great measure, to be accounted for, after all these causes have been enumerated and recognized. The finances of a nation may be disordered, we

conceive, or its representatives assembled, without subverting its constitution. The different of the State may disagree, and grow angry in support of their respective pretensions without tearing the frame of society to pieces, and obliterating every vestige of ancient regulation. The circumstances enumerated by M. Mounier seem to us to be only the occasions, and immediate symptoms of disorder, and not the efficient and ultimate causes. To produce the effects that we have witnessed, there must have been a revolutionary spirit fermenting in the minds of the people, which took advantage of those occurrences, and converted them into engines for its own diffusion and increase. M. Mounier, in short, has given us rather an history of the revolution, than an account of its causes; he has stated events as depending upon one another, which actually proceeded from one common principle; and thought he was explaining the origin of a disorder, when he was only investigating the circumstances that had determined its eruption to one particular member.

He has thus accounted for the revolution, it seems to us, in no other way than an historian would account for an invasion, by describing the route of the assailing army, enumerating the stations they occupied, the defiles that were abandoned to them, and the bridges they broke up in their rear; while he neglected to inform us in what places the invaders had been assembled, by whom they had been trained and enlisted, and how they had been supplied with arms, and intelligence, and audacity. He has stated, as the first causes of the revolution, circumstances that really proved it to be begun; and has gone no farther back than to the earliest of its apparent effects: He has mistaken the cataracts that broke the stream, for the fountains from which it rose; and contented himself with referring the fruit to the blossom, without taking any account of the germination of the seed, or the subterraneous windings of the root.

It is in many cases, we will confess, a matter of great difficulty to distinguish between the predisposing and occasional causes of a complicated political event, or to determine in how far those circumstances that have *facilitated* its production, were really indispensable to its existence. In the question of which we are now treating, however, there does not appear to be an such nicety. M. Mounier maintains that the revolution was occasioned entirely by the financial embarrassments of France, by the convocation of the States-General and the irresolution of the royal councils. The question therefore is not, whether the revolution could have been accomplished without these occurrences; but whether these are sufficient to account for it of

themselves; and whether they leave nothing to be imputed to the influence of the preachers of liberty, and the writings of republican philosophers.

Now, upon this question we profess to entertain an opinion not less decided than that of M. Mounier, though it happens to be diametrically opposite. Had there been no previous tendency to a revolution in France, the government might have declared a bankruptcy, without endangering the foundations of the throne; and the people would have remained quiet and submissive spectators of the quarrels between the ministers and the parliaments, and of the convocation and dissolution of the States-General themselves. This, indeed, is expressly the sentiment of M. Mounier himself, (p. 29), and it is justified by all preceding experience. But if events might have happened in 1690, without endangering the monarchy, that were found sufficient to subvert it in 1790, it is natural to inquire, from what this difference has proceeded? All parties, it is believed, will agree in the answer—It proceeded from the change that had taken place in the condition and sentiments of the people; from the progress of commercial opulence; from the diffusion of information, and the prevalence of political discussion. Now, it seems difficult to deny, that the philosophers were instrumental in bringing about this change; that they had attracted the public attention to the abuses of government, and spread very widely among the people, the sentiment of their grievances and their rights. M. Mounier himself informs us, that, for some time *before* the revolution, the French nation “had been enamoured of the idea of liberty, without understanding very well what it meant, and without being conscious that they were so soon to have an opportunity of attaining it. When that opportunity offered itself,” he adds, “it was seized with an enthusiastic eagerness that paralysed all the nerves of the Sovereign.” He acknowledges also, that the deputies of the Tiers Etat were enabled to disobey the royal mandate for their separation, and to triumph in that disobedience, only because the public opinion was so decidedly in their favour, that nobody could be found who would undertake to disperse them by violence.

We do not wish to push this argument far; we are conscious that many other causes contributed to excite, in the minds of the people, those ideas of independence and reform by which the revolution was effected. The constant example, and increasing intimacy with England—the contagion caught in America—and above all, the advances that had been made in opulence and information, by those classes of the people to whom the exemptions and pretensions of the privileged orders were most obnoxious—all co-operated to

produce a spirit of discontent and innovation, and to increase their dislike and impatience of the defects and abuse of their government. In considering a question of this kind, it should never be forgotten, that it had many defects, and was liable to manifold abuses: But for this very reason, the writers who aggravated these defects and held out these abuses to detestation, were the more likely to make an impression. To say that they made none, and that all the zeal that was testified in France against despotism, and in favour of liberty, was the natural and spontaneous result of reflection and feeling in the minds of those whom it actuated, is to make an assertion which does not sound probable, and certainly has not been proved. That writings, capable of exciting it, existed, and were read, seems not to be contested upon any hand: It is somewhat paradoxical to contend, that they had yet no share in its excitation. If Molière could render the faculty of medicine ridiculous by a few farces, in an age much less addicted to literature; if Voltaire could, by the mere force of writing, advance the interests of infidelity, in opposition to all the orthodox learning of Europe; is it to be imagined, that no effect would be produced by the greatest talents in the world, employed upon a theme the most popular and seductive? Now, if it be true, that for upwards of twenty years before this period, this love of liberty had been inculcated with much zeal and little prudence, in many eloquent and popular publications, and that the names and the maxims of those writers were very much in the mouths of those who patronized the subversion of royalty in that country, is it not reasonable to presume that some part of this enthusiasm for liberty, and some part of that popular favour for those who were supposed to be its champions, by means of which it is allowed that the revolution was accomplished, may be attributed to the influence of those publications?

M. Mounier has asked, if we think that men require to be taught the self-evident doctrine of their rights, and their means of redress; if the Roman insurgents were led by philosophers, when they seceded to Mons Sacer; or, if the Swiss and the Dutch asserted their liberties upon the suggestion of democratical authors? We would answer that, in small states, and barbarous ages, there are abuses so gross, as to be absolutely intolerable, and so qualified, as to become personal to every member of the community; that orators supply the place of writers in those early ages; and that we only deny the influence of the latter, where we are assured of their non-existence. Because a vessel may be carried along by the current, shall we deny that her progress is assisted by the breeze?

We are persuaded therefore, that the writings of those popular

philosophers, who have contended for political freedom, had some share in bringing about the revolution in France; how great, or how inconsiderable a share, we are not qualified to determine, and hold it indeed impossible to ascertain. There are no *data* from which we can estimate the relative force of such an influence; nor does language afford us any terms that are fitted to express its proportions. We must be satisfied with holding that it existed, and that those who deny its operation altogether, are almost as much mistaken as those who make it account for every thing.

But though we conceive that philosophy is thus, in some degree, responsible for the French revolution, we are far from charging her with the guilt that this name implies. The writers to whom we allude, may have produced effects very different from what they intended, and very different even from what their works might seem calculated to produce. An approved medicine may have occasioned convulsions and death; and the flame that was meant to enlighten, may have spread into conflagration and ruin.

M. Mounier, throughout his book, has attended too little to this distinction. He has denied, for the philosophers, all participation in the fact; and has had but little interest, therefore, to justify them on the score of intention. It is a subject, however, which deserves a little consideration.

That there were defects and abuses, and some of these very gross too, in the old system of government in France, we presume will scarcely be denied. That it was lawful to wish for their removal, will probably be as readily admitted; and that the peaceful influence of philosophy, while confined to this object, was laudably and properly exerted, seems to follow as a necessary conclusion. It would not be easy, therefore, to blame those writers who have confined themselves to a dispassionate and candid statement of the advantages of a better institution; and it must seem hard to involve in the guilt of Robespierre and the Jacobins, those persons in France who aimed at nothing more than the abolition of absurd privileges, and the limitation of arbitrary power. Montesquieu, Turgot, and Raynal, were probably, in some degree, dissatisfied with the government of their country, and would have rejoiced in the prospect of a reform; but it can only be the delirium of party prejudice, that would suspect them of wishing for the down-fal of royalty, and for the proscriptions and equality of a reign of terror. It would be treating their accusers too much like men in their senses, to justify such men any farther on the score of intention: yet it is possible that they may have been instrumental in the revolution, and that their writings may have begun that motion, that terminated in ungovernable violence. We will not go over the

common-place arguments that may be stated to convict them of imprudence. Every step that is taken towards the destruction of prejudice, is attended with the danger of an opposite excess: But it is no less our duty to advance against prejudices; and they deserve the highest praise, who unite the greatest steadiness with the greatest precaution. At the time when the writings we are speaking of were published, there was not a man in Europe who could discern in them the seeds of future danger. So far from denouncing them as the harbingers of regicide and confusion, the public received them as hostages and guides to security. It was long thought that their effects were inadequate to their merits: Nothing but the event could have instructed us that it was too powerful for our tranquillity. To such men, the reproach of improvidence can be made only because their foresight was not prophetic; and those alone are entitled to call them imprudent, who could have predicted the tempest in the calm, and foretold those consequences by which the whole world has since been astonished.

If it be true, therefore, that the writers of this description have facilitated and promoted the revolution, it is a truth which should detract but little, either from their merit, or their reputation. Their designs were pure and honourable; and the natural tendency and promise of their labours, was exalted and fair. They failed, by a fatality which they were not bound to foresee; and a concurrence of events, against which it was impossible for them to provide, turned that to mischief, which was planned out by wisdom for good. We do not tax the builder with imprudence, because the fortress which he erected for our protection is thrown down by an earthquake on our heads.

There is another set of writers, however, for whom it will not be so easy to find an apology, who, instead of sober reasoning, and practical observation, have intruded upon the public with every species of extravagance and absurdity. The presumptuous theories, and audacious maxims of Rousseau, Mably, Condorcet, &c. lead a necessary tendency to do harm. They unsettled all the foundations of political duty, and taught the citizens of every existing community, that they were enslaved, and had the power of being free. M. Mounier has too much moderation himself, to approve of the doctrines of these reformers; but he assures us, that instead of promoting the revolution, it was the revolution that raised them into celebrity; that they rose into reputation, after it became necessary to quote them as apologists or authorities; but that, before that time, their speculations were looked upon as brilliant absurdities, that no more deserved a serious confutation, than the Polity of Plato, or the Utopia of Sir Thomas More.—With all our respect for

M. Mounier, we have some difficulty in believing this assertion. Rousseau, in particular, was universally read and admired, long before he was exalted into the Revolutionary Pantheon; and his political sagacity must have had some serious admirers, when, he was himself invited to legislate for an existing community. Whatever influence he had, however, was unquestionably pernicious; and though some apology may be found for him in the enthusiasm of his disordered imagination, he is chargeable with the highest presumption, and the most blameable imprudence. Of some of the other writers who have inculcated the same doctrines, we must speak rather in charity than in justice, if we say nothing more severe.

M. Mounier expresses himself with much judgement and propriety upon the subject of religion; its necessity to a sound morality, and its tendency to promote rational liberty, and to preserve good order. He is of opinion, however, that there is no natural connexion between irreligion and democracy, and thinks that the infidel writers of this age have not to answer for its political enormities. He observes, that it was during the devoutest ages of the Church, that Italy was covered with republics, and that Switzerland asserted her independence; that the revolted States of America were composed of the most religious people of the world; and that the liberty and equality which brought Charles the First to the block, were generated among fanatics and puritans.

Our limits will not allow us to enter fully into the consideration of this very important question. We shall take the liberty to make but two remarks upon the opinion we have just quoted. The one is, that the existence of insurrections in a religious age is no proof of the inefficacy of religion to promote a rational submission to authority;—a check may be very strong, without being altogether insurmountable; and disorders may arise in spite of religion, without discrediting its tendency to suppress them. It surely would be no good ground for denying that intoxication made men quarrelsome, to enumerate the instances in which people had quarrelled when they were sober. The other remark is, that instances taken from the conduct of enthusiasts and bigots, have no fair application to the present question. Fanaticism and irreligion approach very nearly to each other, in their effects on the moral conduct. He who thinks himself a favourite with the Deity, is apt to be as careless of his behaviour, as he who does not believe at all in his existence; both think themselves alike entitled to dispense with the vulgar rules of morality; and both are alike destitute of the curb and the guidance of a sober and rational religion. Submission to lawful authority is indisputably

the maxim of Christianity; and they who destroy our faith in that religion, take away one security for our submission, and facilitate the subversion of governments. This is a great truth, the authority of which is not impaired by the rebellions that priests have instigated or the disorders that fanatics have raised.

After having detained our readers so long with the investigation of M. Mounier's own theory of the revolution, we can scarcely undertake to follow him through all his remarks on the theories of others. He treats, with much scorn and ridicule, the idea of accounting for this great event, by the supposition of an actual conspiracy of philosophers and speculative men; and, upon this subject, we conceive that his statement is correct and satisfactory. There never were any considerable number of literary men in France, we are persuaded, who wished for the subversion of royalty; and the few that entertained that sentiment, expressed it openly in their writings, and do not appear to have taken any extraordinary pains, either to diffuse, or to set it in action. In attempting to prove this pretended conspiracy of the philosophers against the throne, we conceive that the Abbé Baruel has completely failed; and are certain, that his zeal has carried him excesses, which no liberal man will justify. We shall say nothing of the declarations of that miserable hypochondriac (Le Roi), who is said to have revealed the secret of the Committee which met at Baron Holbach's: But when an obscure writer denounces Montesquieu as a conspirator, and loads with every epithet of reproach, the pure and respectable names of Turgot, Malesherbes, and Neckar, the public will know what to think of his charity and his cause. It required certainly nothing less than the acuteness of the *odium theologicum*, to discover in Neckar's book on the importance of religious opinions, a proof of the *atheism* of the writer; and it would require a faith, that had superseded both charity and judgement, to believe that this virtuous minister "excited a famine, to drive the people to revolt; and then ruined the finances, to force them on to rebellion." Our readers will see, with pleasure, the refutation of these calumnies in this publication of M. Mounier. We regret that our limits do not permit us to enter at all into the detail of his observations.

We agree then, upon the whole, with M. Mounier, that the revolution was produced by apparent and natural causes; that there is no room for pretending to *discoveries* upon such a subject; and that the conspiracies, and secret combinations which some writers have affected to disclose, have had no existence, but in their own imaginations. In the year 1786, there probably was not a man in France, who entertained the idea of overthrowing the

throne of the Bourbons; and the party that shook it first, had evidently no connexion with that which laid it in ruins. It would, not be easy to say, then, which party was the agent of this conspiracy of philosophers; and they who fought against each other, could not well be pupils of the same school, nor acting from the same code of instruction. If the Parliaments acted in subordination to this anti-monarchical conspiracy, the leaders of the first National Assembly must have acted against it. If Fayette was its emissary, Orleans must have been its foe. The conspirators who supported Brissot could not have contributed to the success of Robespierre; and the devices by which Robespierre was successful, cannot account for the triumphs of Buonaparte. The idea, in short, of a conspiracy, regularly concerted, and successfully carried on by men calling themselves philosophers, for the establishment of a republic, appears to us to be the most visionary and extravagant. Such a supposition has, no doubt, a fine dramatic effect, and gives an air of theatrical interest to the history; but, in the great tragedy of real life, there are no such fantastic plots, or simple catastrophes. Events are always produced by the co-operation of complicated cause, and the theories that would refer them to extraordinary and mysterious agents, may infallibly be rejected as erroneous.

We differ from M. Mounier, on the other hand, in believing, that though the philosophers did not concert, or organize the revolution in their councils of conspiracy, they yet contributed, in some degree, to its production, by the influence of their writings; the greater part without consciousness or design, and a few through a dangerous zeal for liberty, or an excessive thirst for distinction.

We have now concluded all that we meant to say upon the first part of M. Mounier's publication, or that in which he treats of the philosophers; and the length to which our observations have extended, must confine, within very narrow limits, our remarks on the remaining two parts.

On the subject of Free-Masonry, he treats, we think, with merited contempt, the reveries and visions of the Abbé Baruel, as to the crimes of the Templars, and the doctrine of Manes. He adopts the opinion of Professor Robison, as to the origin of this institution, and enumerates several of the opposite interpretations that have been given of the symbolical representations it employs. He denies that the secret of free-masonry, consists in liberty and equality; and reasons, with great acuteness, upon the absurdity of supposing, that the real import of this secret should have been unknown to its inventors. The Abbé Baruel, he says, maintains that this doctrine was

reserved for the higher orders, and was not taught in England at all: yet he seems to allow, that it was from England that the rest of Europe have derived this institution; and he says, that five out of six of the free-masons in France, had been initiated into this dangerous doctrine. Now, it is strange, that the instructors of all the rest, should have been ignorant of the purport of their doctrine; and it is no less strange, that a doctrine, imparted only to the higher degrees, and withheld from the apprentices, companions, and masters, should have been made known to five sixths of the whole free-masons in France. He admits, that certain individuals may, about the beginning of the revolution, have taken advantage of the secrecy and security of their lodges, to propagate seditious doctrines; but he denies that this was the object of the institution, or that the practice was prevalent to any dangerous degree. Orleans, he admits, was Grand-Master of the French lodges; but he owed that situation to his distinguished birth, and succeeded the Prince of Conti. He vindicates several individuals from the imputation of impiety and disaffection, brought against them by Baruel; and speaks highly of the devotion and morality of many members of the Martiniste, and other most suspected lodges: At the same time, he assures his readers, that he is not himself either a Free-mason or a Martiniste, and complains a little of Professor Robison, for having represented him as such. He allows, that all secret societies are capable of becoming dangerous; and that it is the duty of Government to ascertain what are their doctrines and proceedings; but he alleges, that those of the free-masons have always been puerile and innocent: He observes, that they are still patronized by the friends of government and religion, in every nation of Europe; and reckon among their members, some of the most distinguished princes, prelates, and statesmen, that the age can boast of.

It seems to us to be impossible to refuse our assent to these general conclusions: Yet our author has, perhaps, treated too slightly the abuses which this institution sustained in France, during the first days of the revolution. The secrecy of their meetings and proceedings was certainly very favourable to the propagation of dangerous doctrines, and the concoction of wicked designs. It is highly natural to suppose that advantage would be taken of this circumstance, by those who were then caballing for power. The advantage, however, we certainly believe, was neither indispensable to their success, nor of importance to their progress. To refer the revolution to such a cause, is like referring the progress of a victorious army, to their having occupied a small eminence in their approach; it might cover their array for a

moment, but could never be the means of their conquest. The Jacobin club never assembled under the disguise of a mason lodge, nor any of its affiliated societies; nor is any thing, indeed, more absurd, than to suppose that men should be converted into democrats in a crowd, by the help of mummery, and symbols, and enigmas.

Upon this charge, he observes, in the first place, that the doctrine of the Illuminati, as it appears in their original papers, is essentially different from that of the Jacobin leaders of the revolution: The former were for guiding the existing governments by secret and pacific influence, and were ambitious to enrol potentates and nobles among their members; the latter were for subverting every thing, and waged open war with all that was distinguished by birth or by office. The followers of Weishaupt professed to detest all violence, and to depend upon time and patience for the consummation of their wishes. The Jacobins preached, everywhere, *the sacred duty of insurrection*; and valued themselves upon regenerating a kingdom in a year. The German speculatists terminated their views, in the ultimate disappearance of *every* species of political institution, and the *kingship* of every father of a family. The French empiric pretended to regard the happiness of the individual, as dependent upon the perfection of the constitution under which he was to live. Each, accordingly, has acted in conformity to the principles it professed. The Jacobins have filled all France with desolation and terror. In the three hundred states and principalities of Germany, the Illuminati have not been so much as accused of having excited the slightest disturbance. Their chieftain has found an assylum in the court of a Prince too wise to be a dupe, and too virtuous to be an accomplice. The last part of M. Mounier's work is employed upon the illuminated orders of Germany. Most of our readers have, probably, looked into the publications, in which the views and doctrines of this famous society have lately been denounced to the public. The critical time, at which these writings appeared in this country, gave them an interest, which the subject could never have commanded at any other; and people are still shuddering, in Britain, at a discovery which has been forgotten in Germany for more than a dozen of years. A great part of M. Mounier's observations upon this subject, are directed to elucidate the real views and objects of Weishaupt and his followers. He admits that their practices were illegal, and that their suppression was right. But the lessons taught in the lower degrees, he conceives to have been innocent; and the design of procuring all offices for men of talents, more impracticable than rebellious. The number of princes, nobles, magistrates, &c. that were

initiated, and are recorded as converts, he takes to be a decisive proof of the political safety of the doctrines they made public; and, the non-existence of any insurrection, or tendency to insurrection, either in Bavaria or in any part of the empire, he assumes, with reason, as a decisive argument against the possibility of their being the instigators of the French revolution. We have not leisure to follow him through all the observations he makes upon this subject: It is more to the purpose, to consider what he says as to the direct charge of their having contributed to bring about the French revolution.

In the second place, M. Mounier remarks, that the society of Illuminati was suppressed in 1787; and the French revolution could not be said to have begun till 1789.

In the third place, he observes, and it is an observation that seems of itself nearly decisive of the question, that the name of France is never once mentioned in all that mass of papers that was seized in Bavaria; and that though they contain the most complete lists of their members, and the places of their meetings, there, is not the name of a single Frenchman to be found among the number. With the exception of a few Italians, the society was composed altogether of the natives of Germany.

M. Baruel ascribes the *illumination* of all France to the labours of Bode and De Busch, who spent a few weeks in Paris in the year 1787. M. Mounier treats the idea of this sudden conversion with the ridicule it appears to deserve, and afterwards expresses himself in a more serious manner, in these words:

“I lived, during the first days of the revolution, in the society of many friends to true liberty, (and I hope, to be reckoned among the number), and I am ready to declare upon my oath, that I never had the slightest reason to suspect, that the principles of any one of them were influenced, in the smallest degree, by the societies of Free-Masons, or of Illuminati. I also knew many at that time, whose conduct was less laudable, and who afterwards steered the vessel of the State into the middle of shoals and dangers; but for them also, I can make the same protestation.”

When the character and opportunities of M. Mounier are attended to, this testimony must be allowed to possess very great authority.

He denies, that the story of Mirabeau's illumination is entitled to any credit. “The emissaries of Weishaupt would have attempted in vain,” he says, “either to add to his information, to change his opinions, or to correct his

vices.” With regard to Prunelle De Lierre, whom Baruel accuses of having attempted to seduce Camille Jordan into the sect of Illuminati, and of having corresponded with him for that purpose, M. Mounier avers, that *he has it from Jordan himself*, that De Lierre never spoke to him on the subject of the Illuminati, never mentioned the name in his presence, and never wrote to him a syllable upon the subject.

Upon the facts contained in these statements, we are not qualified to decide; but the opinions expressed by the author, meet in general with our approbation. The object of the Illuminated Orders was probably, in its own nature, unattainable; and they would have perished by their internal dissensions, before they could have given any disturbance to the community. At the same time, their constitution was a system of manifest usurpation; and, independently of the doctrines they taught, their secret association alone, made them a proper object of reprobation. We are persuaded, at the same time, that their principles never spread beyond the precincts of Germany; and that they had no sort of share in producing the revolution in France. M. Baruel himself will not deny, that there is not a word in the papers of the sect, that could so much as suggest that idea; and the circumstances, by which he endeavours to support it, prove nothing to an impartial mind, but his own zeal and credulity.

We cannot dismiss this work of M. Mounier's, without bearing testimony, once more, to the candour and liberality which he has constantly preserved in treating of a subject that has, more than any other, exasperated the prejudices of men. The time is coming, we hope, when this praise will confer less distinction; and when men, recovering from their apprehensions, and cooling from their contests, shall begin to study the moral of that great tragedy, by which they have all been agitated, as actors or spectators.

M. Mounier's style is clear, concise, and energetic; he does not aim at pathetic eloquence, and never offends by that frothy declamation, which has been so common among the politicians of his country. His arguments are sometimes imperfectly expressed; and he frequently writes like a man, who despises the objections of his antagonists too much, to give them a good answer. As a short specimen of his manner of composition, we shall subjoin the following character of Mirabeau:

“The restless ambition of Mirabeau, and his insatiable thirst for celebrity, riches, and power; made him, at the same moment, the slave of every party in the State. I have seen him go from the nocturnal committees of

the partizans of Orleans, to the meetings of the determined republicans; and from those, again, to the cabinets of the King's ministers. He was always willing, however, to have sided with the latter; and, if they had granted him the terms he expected, he would have preferred the support of Royalty to an alliance with men he despised. His principles are not to be judged of, by the innumerable contradictions that occur in his speeches and publications. In these, he never studied so much to say what he thought, as what was most suitable to his interest at the existing crisis. To me he has frequently communicated his real opinions; and a man, certainly, I have never known, of an understanding more enlightened, of a more consummate knowledge of politics, of a character more venal, or a heart more depraved. He sold himself, in the end, several times over to the Court: But, before the purchase was completed, he had become unserviceable for anything but mischief; and had so entangled himself with the demagogues and perturbators of the public peace, that he could not speak reasonably, without being accused of treachery to their cause.”

ART. II. *Spital Sermon*, preached at Christ-church upon Easter Tuesday, April 15. 1800. To which are added, Notes by Samuel Parr, LL. D. Printed for J. Mawman in the Poultry. 1801. Quarto. Closely printed. pp. 161.

WHOEVER has had the good fortune to see Dr Parr's wig, must have observed, that while it trespasses a little on the orthodox magnitude of perukes in the anterior parts, it scorns even Episcopal limits behind, and swells out into boundless. convexity of frizz, the **mega fauna** of barbers, and the terror of the literary world. After the manner of his wig, the Doctor has constructed his sermon, giving us a discourse of no common length, and subjoining an immeasurable mass of notes, which appear to concern every learned thing, every learned man, and almost every unlearned man since the beginning of the world.

For his text, Dr Parr has chosen *Gal. vi. 10. As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good to all men, especially to those who are of the household of faith.* After a short preliminary comparison between the dangers of the selfish system, and the modern one of universal benevolence, he divides his sermon into two parts. In the first, examining how far, by the constitution of human nature, and the circumstances of human life, the principles of particular and universal benevolence are compatible: In the last, commenting on the nature of the charitable institution, for which he is preaching.

The former part is levelled against the doctrines of Mr Godwin; and, here, Dr Parr exposes, very strongly and happily, the folly of making universal benevolence the *immediate motive* of our actions. As we consider this, though of no very difficult execution, to be by far the best part of the sermon, we shall very willingly make some extracts from it.

‘To me it appears, that the modern advocates for universal philanthropy have fallen into the error charged upon those who are fascinated by a violent and extraordinary fondness for what a celebrated author calls “some moral species.” Some men, it has been remarked, are hurried into romantic adventures, by their excessive admiration of fortitude. Others are actuated by a headstrong zeal, for disseminating the true religion. Hence, while the only properties, for which fortitude or zeal can be esteemed are scarcely discernible, from the enormous bulkiness to which they are swollen, the ends, to which alone they can be directed usefully, are overlooked or defeated; the public good is impaired, rather than

increased; and the claims that other virtues equally obligatory have to our notice, are totally disregarded. Thus, too, when any dazzling phantoms of universal philanthropy have seized our attention, the objects that formerly engaged it, shrink and fade. All considerations of kindred, friends and countrymen, drop from the mind, during the struggles it makes to grasp the collective interests of the species; and when the association that attached as to them has been dissolved, the notions we have formed of their comparative insignificance will prevent them from recovering, I do not say any hold whatsoever, but that *strong* and *lasting* hold they once had; upon our conviction and our feelings. Universal benevolence, should it, from any strange combination of circumstances, ever become passionate, will, like every other passion, “justify itself:” and the importunity of its demands to obtain a hearing, will be proportionate to the weakness of its cause. But what are the consequences? A perpetual wrestling for victory between the refinements of sophistry, and the remonstrances of indignant nature—the agitations of secret distrust in opinions, which gain few or no proselytes and feelings which excite little or no sympathy—the neglect of all the usual duties, by which social life is preserved or adorned; and in the pursuit of other duties which are unusual, and indeed imaginary, a succession of airy projects, eager hopes, tumultuous efforts, and galling disappointments, such, in truth, as every wise man foresaw, and a good man would rarely commiserate.’

In a subsequent part of his sermon, Dr Parr handles the same topic with equal success.

The stoics, it has been said, were more successful in weakening the tender affections, than in animating men to the stronger virtues of fortitude and self-command; and possible it is, that, the influence of our modern reformers may be greater, in furnishing their disciples with pleas for the neglect of their ordinary duties, than in stimulating their endeavours for the performance of those which are extraordinary, and perhaps ideal. If, indeed, the representations we have lately heard of universal philanthropy, served only to amuse the fancy of those who approve of them, and to communicate that pleasure which arises from contemplating the magnitude and grandeur of a favourite subject, we might be tempted to smile at them as groundless and harmless. But they tend to debate the dignity, and to weaken the efficacy of those particular

affections, for which we have daily and hourly occasion in the events of real life. They tempt us to substitute the ease of speculation, and the pride of dogmatism, for the toil of practice. To a class of artificial and ostentatious sentiments, they give the most dangerous triumph over the genuine and salutary dictates of nature. They delude and, inflame our minds with pharisaical notions of superior wisdom and superior virtue; and, what is the worst of all, they may be used as “a cloke to us” for insensibility, where other men feel; and for negligence, where other men act with *visible* and *useful*, though *limited*, effect.’

In attempting to shew the connexion between particular and universal benevolence, Dr Parr does not appear to us to have taken a clear and satisfactory view of the subject. Nature impels us both to good and bad actions; and, even in the former, gives us no measure by which we may prevent them from degenerating into excess. Rapine and revenge, are not less natural than parental and filial affection; which latter class of feelings may themselves be a source of crimes, if they overpower (as they frequently do) the sense of justice. It is not, therefore, a sufficient justification of our actions, that they are natural. We must seek, from our reason, some principle which will enable us to determine what impulses of nature we are to obey, and what we are to resist: such is that of general utility, or, what is the same thing, of universal good; a principle which sanctifies and limits the more particular affections. The duty of a son to a parent, or a parent to a son, is not an ultimate principle of morals, but depends on the principle of universal good, and is only praiseworthy, because it is found to promote it. At the same time, our spheres of action and intelligence are so confined, that it is better, in a great majority of instances, to suffer our conduct to be guided by those affections which have been long sanctioned by the approbation of mankind, than to enter into a process of reasoning, and investigate the relation which every trifling event might bear to the general interests of the world. In his principle of universal benevolence, Mr Godwin is unquestionably right. That it is the grand principle on which all morals rest—that it is the corrective for the excess of all particular affections, we believe to be undeniable; and he is only erroneous in excluding the particular affections; because, in so doing, he deprives us of our most powerful means of promoting his own principle of universal good; for it is as much as to say, that all the crew ought to have the *general* welfare of the ship so much at heart, that no sailor should ever pull any *particular* rope, or hand any *individual* sail. By universal benevolence, we

mean, and understand Dr Parr to mean, not a barren affection for the species, but, a desire to promote their real happiness; and of this principle, he thus speaks:

‘I admit, and I approve of it, as an *emotion* of which general happiness is the cause, but not as a passion, of which according to the usual order of human affairs, it could often be the object. I approve of it as a disposition to wish, and, as opportunity may occur, to desire and do good, rather than harm, to those with whom we are quite unconnected.’

It would appear, from this kind of language, that a desire of promoting the universal good, a pardonable weakness, rather than a fundamental principle of ethics; that the particular affections were incapable of excess; and that they never wanted the corrective of a more generous and exalted feeling. In a subsequent part of his sermon, Dr Parr atones a little for this over-zealous depreciation of the principle of universal benevolence; but he nowhere states the particular affections to derive their value and their limits from their subservience to a more extensive philanthropy. He does not shew us that they exist only as virtues, from their instrumentality in promoting the general good; and that, to preserve their true character, they should be frequently referred to that principle as their proper criterion. In the latter part of his sermon, Dr Parr combats the general objections of Mr Turgot to all charitable institutions with considerable vigour and success. To say that an institution is necessarily bad, because it will not always be administered with the same zeal, proves a little too much; for it is an objection to political and religious, as well as to charitable institutions; and, from a lively apprehension of the fluctuating characters of those who govern, would leave the world without any government at all. It is better there should be an asylum for the mad, and a hospital for the wounded, if they were to squander away 50 *per cent.* of their income, than that we should be disgusted with sore limbs, and shocked by straw-crown'd monarchs in the streets. All institutions of this kind must suffer the risk of being governed by more or less of probity and talents. The good which one active character effects, and the wise order which he establishes, may outlive him for a long period; and we all hate each other's crimes, by which we gain nothing, so much, that in proportion as public opinion acquires ascendancy in any particular country, every public institution becomes more and more guaranteed from abuse.

Upon the whole, this sermon is rather the production of what is called a

sensible, than of a very acute man; of a man certainly more remarkable for his learning, than his originality. It refutes the very refutable positions of Mr Godwin, without placing the doctrine of benevolence in a clear light; and it almost leaves us to suppose, that the particular affections are themselves ultimate principles of action, instead of convenient instruments of a more general principle.

The style is such, as to give a general impression of heaviness to the whole sermon. The Doctor is never simple and natural for a single instant. Every thing smells of the rhetorician. He never appears to forget himself, or to be hurried by his subject into obvious language. Every expression seems to be the result of artifice and intention; and as to the worthy dedicatees, the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, unless the sermon be *done into English by a person of honour*, they may perhaps be flattered by the Doctor's politeness, but they can never be much edified by his meaning. Dr Parr seems to think, that eloquence consists not in an exuberance of beautiful images—not in simple and sublime conceptions—not in the feelings of the passions; but in studious arrangement of *sonorous, exotic, and sesquipedal* words: a very ancient error, which corrupts the style of young, and wearies the patience of sensible men. In some of his combinations of words, the Doctor is singularly unhappy. We have the *din of superficial cavillers, the prancing of giddy ostentation, fluttering vanity, hissing scorn, dank clod, &c. &c. &c.* The following intrusion of a technical word into a pathetic description, renders the whole passage almost ludicrous.

‘Within a few days, mute was the tongue that uttered these celestial sounds, and the hand which signed your indenture lay cold. and motionless in the dark and dreary chambers of death.’

In page 16, Dr Parr, in speaking of the indentures of the hospital, a subject (as we should have thought) little calculated for rhetorical panegyric, says of them—

‘If the writer of whom I am speaking, had perused, as I have, your indentures and your rules, he would have found in them seriousness without austerity, earnestness without extravagance, good sense without the trickeries of art, good language without the trappings of rhetoric, and the firmness of conscious worth, rather than the prancings of giddy ostentation.’

The latter member of this elege would not be wholly unintelligible, if applied to a spirited coach horse; but we have never yet witnessed the phenomenon of a *prancing indenture*.

It is not our intention to follow Dr Parr through the copious, and varied learning of his notes; in the perusal of which, we have been as much delighted with the richness of his acquisitions, the vigour of his understanding, and the genuine goodness of his heart, as we have been amused with his ludicrous self-importance, and the miraculous simplicity of his character. We would rather recommend it to the Doctor, to publish an annual list of worthies, as a kind of stimulus to literary men; to be included in which, will unquestionably be considered as great an honour, as for a commoner to be elevated to the peerage. A line of Greek, a line of Latin, or no line at all, subsequent to each name, will distinguish, with sufficient accuracy, the shades of merit, and the degree of immortality conferred.

Why should Dr Parr confine this *eulogomania* to the literary characters of this island alone? In the university of Benares, in the lettered kingdom of Ava, among the Mandarins at Peking, there must, doubtless, be many men who have the eloquence of *\*barruonos*, the feeling of *tasloros*, and the judgment of *ochnros*, of whom Dr Parr might be happy to say, that they have profundity without obscurity—perspicuity without prolixity—ornament without glare—terseness without barrenness—penetration without subtlety—comprehensiveness, without digression—and a great number of other things without a great number of other things.

In spite of 32 pages of very close printing in defence of the University of Oxford, is it, or is it not true, that very many of its Professors enjoy ample salaries, without reading any lectures at all? The character of particular Colleges will certainly vary with the character of their governors; but the University of Oxford so far differs from Dr Parr, in the commendation he has bestowed upon its state of *public* education, that they have, since the publication of his book, we believe, and forty years after Mr Gibbon's residence, completely abolished their very ludicrous and disgraceful exercises for degrees, and have substituted, in their place, a system of exertion, and a scale of academical honours, calculated (we are willing to hope) to produce the happiest effects.

We were very sorry, in reading Dr Parr's note on the Universities, to meet

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\*. Pantēs men nom *p. doroi ego*, Ochnron men oetho schunchlo *de Barrol j thilo* Tailoroi. 50: in *Vita Daemonact.* vol. ii. p. 394. --(Dr Parr's note.)

with the following passage:

‘Ill would it become me, tamely and silently to acquiesce in the strictures of this formidable accuser, upon a seminary to which I owe many obligations, though I left it, as, must not be dissembled, before the usual time, and, in truth, had been almost compelled to leave it, *not* by the want of a proper education, for I had arrived at the first place in the first form of Harrow School, when I was not quite fourteen not by the want of useful tutors, for mine were eminently able, and to me had been uniformly kind—not by the want of ambition, for I had begun to look up ardently and anxiously to academical distinctions—not by the want of attachment to the place, for I regarded it then, as I continue to regard it now, with the fondest and most unfeigned affection—but by another want, which it were, unnecessary to name, and for the supply of which, after some hesitation, I determined to provide by patient toil and resolute self-denial, when I had not completed my twentieth year. I ceased, therefore, to reside, with an aching heart: I looked back with mingled feelings of regret and humiliation, to advantages of which I could no longer partake, and honours to which I could no longer aspire.’

To those who know the truly honourable and respectable Character of Dr Parr, the vast extent of his learning, and the unadulterated benevolence of his nature, such an account cannot but be very affecting, in spite of the bad taste in which it is communicated. How painful to reflect, that a truly devout and attentive minister, a strenuous defender of the church establishment, and by far the most learned man of his day, should be permitted to languish on a little paltry curacy in Warwickshire!

—Dii meloria, &c. &c.